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Abstract
We study the equilibrium in a risk exchange, where agents’ preferences are
characterised by generalised (rank-dependent) expected utility, i.e. by a con-
cave utility and a convex probability distortion (Quiggin, 1993). We obtain
explicit results for the equilibrium price density, thus generalising Bühlmann’s
(1980, 1984) formulas. For linear utility functions, we show that the agents’
preference maximisation problem is equivalent to minimisation of portfolio
risk and reformulate it in an insurance context, as premium maximisation un-
der risk capital constraints induced by a coherent risk measure. We find that
equilibrium is only reached if the same risk measure is applied throughout
the market. Finally, we discuss the analogy of the exchange to a pooling ar-
rangement and show that equilibrium prices can be obtained as marginal cost
prices for an agent representing the collective (pool) of market players. From
that perspective we discuss the links between equilibrium pricing, cooperative
games and capital allocation.
Keywords: competitive equilibrium, risk exchange, generalised expected utility,
cooperative games, coherent risk measures
1The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of Lloyd’s of London. The views expressed
in this paper are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Lloyd’s of London.
1 Introduction
Equilibrium models of insurance markets have been extensively studied in the actuarial
literature (Borch (1962), Bühlmann (1980, 1984), Aase (1993, 2002)). In these models,
(re)insurance markets have been represented as exchange economies, where individual
agents decide on their optimal consumption of random assets and liabilities via expected
utility maximisation. Market prices are obtained by a market clearing condition, and are
represented by linear pricing functionals. The pricing functional can in turn be repre-
sented as an expectation under a change of probability measure and the corresponding
Radon-Nikodym derivative is called a ‘price density’. A pioneering paper in this area has
been by Borch (1962), while Bühlmann obtained explicit formulae for the price density,
first in the case of exponential utilities (1980), and later for more general utility functions
(1984). Aase (1993) offers a comprehensive discussion of equilibrium models in insur-
ance/financial markets, including characterisations of Pareto optimal risk allocations and
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibria. A more general
review of the literature on risk sharing and a consolidation of well-known and new results
is provided by Aase (2002).
The above-mentioned papers rely on the characterisation of economic agents’ prefer-
ences through utility functions. However, almost since the inception of expected utility
theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), serious doubts have been raised by
economists as regards the validity of the expected utility hypothesis as a means to describ-
ing the preferences of economic agents (for example, Allais (1953)). The contentious issue
has in general been the independence axiom of expected utility theory, which has been
found to be frequently violated in practice, with characteristic examples being the Allais
and Elsberg paradoxes (for a detailed discussion see Quiggin, 1993). Alternative theories
of choice have been proposed, among others, by Quiggin (1982, 1993), Yaari (1987) and
Schmeidler (1989). The closely related theories of choice propagated by these authors
have become known under names such as generalised (or anticipated) expected utility,
rank-dependent utility and Choquet expected utility. They are generally characterised
by a modification or relaxation of the independence axiom. The resulting preference
functionals are akin to the expected utility operator, with the difference that the additive
probability measure is either substituted by a non-additive set function (or ‘capacity’,
Schmeidler (1989)) or distorted by a nonlinear function (Yaari (1987), Quiggin (1993)).
The distortion of the probability measure can be interpreted either as a transformation
which (in the case of a risk averse agent) increases the probability of adverse events, or as
a mechanism for producing a set of probability measures, with the expected utility being
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calculated with respect to the ‘worst-case measure’ in that set.
Even though the mathematical and economic machinery provided by generalised ex-
pected utility has been around for a number of years, the consequences for equilibrium
models of using such generalised preferences have not been explored in the bibliogra-
phy, with Chateauneuf et al. (2000) forming a rare exception. The first contribution of
this paper is to reformulate the equilibrium models of Borch (1962) and Bühlmann (1980,
1984), for the case that preferences are consistent with generalised expected utility. Thus,
each market agent’s preferences are characterised by a utility and a probability distortion
function. It is shown that the agents’ risk allocations after the exchange are comono-
tonic, a fact that makes the explicit calculation of price densities possible. The technique
of defining a collective risk aversion function, as the inverse of the sum of agents’ risk
tolerances, is extended via the additional definition of a collective uncertainty aversion
function, induced by the agents’ probability distortion functions. We calculate explicitly
the equilibrium price density in the risk exchange, first for the case of exponential utility
and distortion functions and then for more general functions. We thus extend the pricing
formulae of Bühlmann, our own formulae figuring an additional term, which captures the
effect of probability distortion.
A relatively recent development in the financial literature has been the emergence of
a sophisticated theory of risk measures, as a means for determining capital requirements
for the holders of risky positions. The axiomatic definition of coherent risk measures by
Arztner et al. (1999) has by now achieved the status of a classic in this subject area.
However, the functional forms and fundamental properties of risk measures have been
extensively studied in the actuarial literature for more than thirty years, in the guise
of premium calculation principles (e.g. Bühlmann (1970), Goovaerts et al. (1984)). A
class of risk measures, termed distortion premium principles, were introduced by Den-
neberg (1990) and Wang (1996). These turn out to be a specific subclass of coherent risk
measures, while being consistent with Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice.
We explore the equilibrium implications of agents’ economic decision-making, based on
risk measures belonging to the class of distortion principles. Agents choose their optimal
consumptions of random assets and liabilities by minimizing their risk measure, subject to
a budget condition. An equivalent problem, if the agents correspond to (re)insurers, is to
let them maximise their premium income, subject to the constraint that each insurer’s risk
(as measured by the distortion principle) does not exceed his surplus, net of reinsurance
expenditure. The second contribution of this paper is to formulate and study these
equilibrium models. It is shown that they emerge as a special cases of the general risk
exchange model, when all agents’ utility functions are taken to be linear. The market
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defined in this case achieves an equilibrium only if all agents share the same risk measure
and we comment on the implications of this result for risk management and regulation.
In the equilibrium models studied in this paper, it is always found that the price
density and agents’ risk allocations after the exchange are functions only of the aggre-
gate risk in the market. This, as observed by Borch (1962), invites a re-interpretation
of the risk exchange as a pooling arrangement, where all agents pool their assets and
liabilities and then buy any desired cashflow from the pool according to an agreed price
mechanism. The third contribution of our paper is to show that this price mechanism
corresponds to marginal cost pricing, where the cost function is determined via an in-
difference argument. Indifference is here defined through the aggregate preferences of
the collective, which were derived in the context of the equilibrium model. We further-
more give an economic justification of marginal cost prices, by interpreting the pooling
arrangement as a cooperative game (Aumann and Shapley, 1974), for which the marginal
cost mechanism is a semi-value (Dubey et al. (1981), Samet and Tauman (1982)). For
an equilibrium model with risk measures, marginal cost pricing produces a cost sharing
mechanism, which is the (Aumann-Shapley) value of the game. This produces a link
between equilibrium pricing and the capital allocation methodology studied by Denault
(2001) and Tsanakas and Barnett (2002).
In the following section we discuss preference functionals based on distorted prob-
abilities and their relationship to a class of coherent risk measures. In section 3 the
risk exchange equilibrium model is studied and formulae for the price functional and the
risk allocation to the agents after the exchange are obtained. The case of linear utility
functions and the equivalent problem of equilibrium with risk measures are treated in
section 4. In section 5 we elaborate on the analogy of the exchange to a pooling arrange-
ment and discuss the links between equilibrium pricing, marginal costs and cooperative
games. Finally, in section 6 we conclude with some remarks on Pareto efficiency, market
completeness and topics for future research.
2 Preferences and risk measures
2.1 Individual preferences and generalised expected utility
In this paper, a one-period economy is considered. At time 0 economic agents (e.g.
financial institutions, insurance companies) make decisions concerning their consumption
of random assets and liabilities. At some fixed future time t the state of the world is
revealed and gains and losses are realised.
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We define a probability space (Ω,P0,F). Ω is the set of all possible states of the
world at time t, P0 is the actuarial (‘real-world’) probability measure, and F ⊂ 2Ω is a
σ-algebra representing the amount of information available to the agents at the time of
economic decision-making.
We consider a set, X , of random variables on this probability space, which represent
investment positions available to the market agents. Elements of X are henceforth called
cashflows. For technical reasons we will assume that X also contains all Bernoulli(u)
(u ∈ [0, 1]) variables. We denote by E[·] the expectation operator under P0 and use the
notation SX(x) = P0(X > x) for the decumulative distribution function of X ∈ X .
For each market agent, a preference relation ‘º’ is defined on X , ‘X º Y ’ being
shorthand for ‘cashflow X ∈ X is preferable to cashflow Y ∈ X ’. We assume that the
preference relation is consistent with the axioms of Schmeidler (1989). Then a preference
functional V : X 7→ R exists such that:
V (X) ≥ V (Y )⇔ X º Y. (1)






(γ(u(X) > x)− 1)dx+
∫ ∞
0
γ(u(X) > x)dx, (2)
where γ : F 7→ R is a unique increasing set function with γ(∅) = 0, γ(Ω) = 1, and u is an
increasing real valued function, unique up to affine transformations. Choquet integrals
are defined with respect to monotone set functions (or ‘capacities’) instead of additive
measures (Choquet (1954), Denneberg (1994)).
It is shown in Wang et al. (1997) that, given that X contains all Bernoulli variables,
an increasing set function γ as above can be represented by:
γ(A) = h(P0(A)), ∀A ∈ F , (3)
where h : R 7→ R is an increasing function with h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1. Thus the preference






(h(Su(X) > x)− 1)dx+
∫ ∞
0
h(Su(X) > x)dx (4)
Here u is the well-known von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, while h is called
a probability distortion function and γ = h(P0) a distorted probability. Thus the gener-
alised expected utility operator Vu,h is akin to expected utility, with the difference that
probability measure P0 has been replaced by the distorted probability h(P0).
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As is usual in the bibliography, we will call an agent risk averse whenever the utility
function u is concave. Correspondingly, we will call an agent uncertainty averse whenever
the distortion function h is convex. Concavity of the utility function and convexity of the
distortion function are necessary and sufficient conditions for the preference functional
Vu,h to preserve second order stochastic dominance (Quiggin, 1993). Assuming that h is
differentiable, it is easy to rewrite (5) as (see Lemma 1):
Vu,h(X) = E[u(X)h
′(SX(X))] (5)
Thus for an uncertainty averse agent, since h′ is increasing, the effect of the distortion
function is to assign a higher probability weighting to less favourable events (i.e. when
SX(X) is high, equivalently X is low).
Another interpretation of the probability distortion is as follows. It can be shown
(Denneberg, 1994), that if h is convex and P0 is a measure, the distorted probability
h(P0) is a supermodular set function and can be written as (Denneberg, 1994):
h(P0)(A) = inf
P≥h(P0)
P(A), A ∈ F (6)
The preference operator can then be written as:
Vu,h(X) = inf
P≥h(P0)
EP[X], X ∈ X (7)
By viewing the set of measures {P : P ≥ h(P0)} as a collection of alternative scenarios
regarding the probability distribution of X, it is apparent that the preference operator
Vu,h represents the expected utility of X under the most adverse of those scenarios.
We assume here and in the sequel that the utility and distortion functions are contin-











Note that we can determine the utility and distortion functions from the risk and uncer-
tainty aversion coefficients, by solving the differential equations (8) and (9) respectively.
The resulting utility and distortion functions will be unique up to a normalisation of the
utility function (e.g. u(0) = 0, u′(0) = 1, given also that h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1).









It is easily seen that these utility and distortion functions have constant risk and uncer-








2.2 Coherent risk measures and distorted probabilities
A risk measure is defined as a functional R : X 7→ R. R(X) represents ‘the minimum
extra cash that the agent has to add to the risky position X, and to invest “prudently”,
to be allowed to proceed with his plans’ (Artzner et al., 1999). ‘Invest prudently’, in this
paper, is taken to mean with zero interest.
A coherent risk measure is defined by Artzner et al. (1999) as a risk measure satisfying
the following properties:
Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y a.s. then R(X) ≥ R(Y )
Subadditivity: R(X + Y ) ≤ R(X) +R(Y )
Positive Homogeneity: If a ∈ R+ then R(aX) = aR(X)
Translation Invariance: If a ∈ R then R(X + a) = R(X)− a
Two random variables, X,Y , are called comonotonic if there exists a random vari-
able U and non-decreasing functions d, e such that X = d(U), Y = e(U) (Dhaene et
al., (2002)). Comonotonicity corresponds to the strongest form of positive dependence
between random variables. An economic interpretation of comonotonicity is that comono-
tonic risks cannot be used as hedges for each other (Yaari, 1987). In the framework of
coherent risk measurement, an additional desirable property is additivity for comonotonic
risks:
Comonotonic Additivity: If X,Y are comonotonic, then R(X + Y ) = R(X) +R(Y )
It can be shown that, if and only if R(X) is a coherent risk measure satisfying comono-
tonic additivity, it has a representation as the negative of a Choquet integral with respect






(γ(X > x)− 1)dx−
∫ ∞
0
γ(X > x)dx (12)
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As in the previous section (equation (3)), we will represent the supermodular set function
γ by a distorted probability h(P0), where h is increasing and convex with h(0) = 0, h(1) =








Such risk measures, based on distorted probabilities, where first introduced in the context
of insurance pricing by Denneberg (1990) and Wang (1996). Similarly to equation (7) we
can represent the risk measure Rh via a collection of probability measures:
Rh(X) = − inf
P≥h(P0)
EP[X] (14)
Consider now an agent, whose preferences are characterised by a linear utility function
u(x) = x and a convex probability distortion h (such preferences we introduced by Yaari






It is evident that Rh(X) = −vh(X). We can actually derive the risk measure Rh from vh
via a simple indifference argument. Assume that the agent insures a liability X and that
his initial wealth is w. The price Rh(X) that the agent charges for insuring the liability
X is obtained by solving:
vh(w) = vh(w +X +Rh(X))
infP≥h(P0)EP[w] = infP≥h(P0)EP[w +X +Rh(X)]⇔




Let an agent’s preferences be characterised by a utility function u and a distortion function
h. In this section we state some auxiliary results, concerning the operator Vu,h, that are
going to be extensively used in the sequel. The assumptions that we make for the proof
of these lemmas are used throughout the paper. These are:
• The functions u(x) : R 7→ R and h(x) : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] are differentiable and strictly
increasing.
• All survival functions SX(x) : R 7→ [0, 1] are continuous and strictly decreasing.
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• All random variables in X are square-integrable, i.e. X ⊂ L2(Ω,F ,P0). Further-
more, elements of X are assumed to have continuous conditional densities, in the
sense of Appendix B.





vh(X) = −Rh(X) = E[Xh
′(SX(X))]
Lemma 2. Let X,N ∈ X and β ∈ R. Then Vu,h(X + βN) is differentiable with respect
to β and the partial derivative equals:
∂Vu,h(X + βN)
∂β








= E[Nh′(SX+βN(X + βN))]
3 Risk exchange
3.1 General setup
Let n agents, standing for financial institutions ((re)insurance companies and/or banks),
be participating in an exchange economy. Each holds an initial random (including cash)
endowment Xi ∈ X , i = 1, ..., n, which can be traded in the exchange. Let F be the σ-
algebra generated by the initial endowments Xi, i = 1, ..., n. Agents can acquire through
trading any cashflow Y ∈ X which is measurable with respect to F . Additionally we
assume that a safe asset 1Ω is traded in the market. We note that this collection of
available cashflows includes nonlinear functions of the initial endowments and thus is
wider than the one usually defined in the financial literature, which consists of linear
combinations of traded instruments, see e.g. Duffie (1988).
We assume that market prices are given by a linear functional π(X) = E[ζX], where
ζ is a F -measurable random variable. The price of the safe asset is taken to be 1, hence:
π[1Ω] = 1⇒ E[ζ] = 1 (17)
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Preferences are taken to conform to generalised expected utility theory, as described
in section 2.1, and are consistent with second order stochastic dominance. Thus each
agent is equipped with a strictly increasing and concave utility function ui and a strictly
increasing and convex probability distortion hi, i = 1, 2, ..., n. For simplicity we assume
that both ui and hi are continuous and twice differentiable. We denote the i
th agent’s
preference functional as Vi. The i





subject to the budget constraint:
π(Yi) ≤ π(Xi) (19)
3.2 Conditions for equilibrium






The economy will be at equilibrium if and when all agents have solved their preference




Yj = Z (21)




Vi(Yi)− λi(π(Yi)− π(Xi)) (22)
To solve this maximisation problem we proceed using some standard methodology from
variational calculus. For N ∈ X we define:
f(β) = Vi(Yi + βN)− λi(π(Yi + βN)− π(Xi)) (23)
In order that the objective function of (18) achieves an optimum at Yi it must be:
f ′(0) = 0, ∀N ∈ X (24)
From Lemma 2 we obtain:
f ′(β) = E[Nu′i(Yi + βN)h
′
i(SYi+βN(Yi + βN))]− λiπ(N) (25)
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Thus:
f ′(0) = E[Nu′i(Yi)h
′
i(SYi(Yi))]− λiπ(N) (26)
Equations (24), (26) yield the following condition for equilibrium:
u′i(Yi)h
′
i(SYi(Yi)) = λiζ, ∀i = 1, ..., n (27)







i ◦ SYi(x) (28)










i ◦ SYi(x)fYi(x)) < 0, (29)
since the functions u′i, h
′
i are strictly decreasing and increasing respectively. Thus ηi
is strictly decreasing. Therefore its inverse η−1i exists and is also strictly decreasing.
We observe that all random variables Yi = η
−1
i (ζ) are strictly decreasing functions of
the random variable ζ, hence they are comonotonic. An obvious consequence is that
the random variables Yi, i = 1, ..., n are also comonotonic to (increasing functions of)




Comonotonicity of the Yi’s has the following two consequences (see e.g. Dhaene et al.,
2002), which will be used in the sequel:
FYi(Yi) = FZ(Z) = U, ∀i = 1, ..., n, (30)








(p) = F−1Z (p) (31)
An economic characterisation of comonotonic risks is that they cannot be used as
hedges for each other (Yaari, 1987). The fact that the final positions Yi are comonotonic
has the interpretation that agents have ridded themselves of the individual risk embedded
in their initial endowments Xi and are left only with the market’s systemic risk. Thus
our model is consistent with a well known tenet of capital asset pricing.
3.3 Solution for exponential utility and distortion functions
Before proceeding with the calculation of equilibrium prices for more general utility and
distortion functions, we study the case of exponential utility and distortion. We thus
generalise the celebrated pricing formulas of Bühlmann (1980).
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Let each agent be equipped with an exponential utility function with risk aversion









The first and second derivatives of these functions are:
u′i(x) = e
−ρix > 0, u′′i (x) = −ρie















The condition (27) for equilibrium derived earlier yields:
u′i(Yi)h
′
i(SYi(Yi)) = λiζ ⇒














By summing both sides of the above equation over i and taking into account the clearing














































































Now, by the following equations we define the collective risk aversion ρ and collective



















































Then equation (41) becomes:
ρZ + τU = K − ln ζ ⇒
ζ = e−ρZ−τUeK
(43)
Since we have assumed that there exists in the market a risk-free asset 1Ω with unit




E[e−ρZ−τUeK ] = 1⇒
eK = E[e−ρZ−τU ]−1
(44)








Note that this is a generalisation of the Esscher transform, which was obtained by
Bühlmann (1980), who studied a market model where agents’ preferences are charac-
terised by utility functions only. The probability weighting factor exp(−ρZ) in the price
density, associates the price of a traded cashflow with the absolute random value of the
market portfolio Z. The fact that it is a decreasing function of Z has the interpretation
that a cashflow, which is likely to assume a high value when Z is low, is traded at a high
price because of its usefulness in hedging market risk. On the other hand, the additional
probability weighting exp(−τFZ(Z)) that we introduce is due to collective uncertainty
aversion and associates the price of a cashflow with the rank of the outcome of Z, in the
set of possible outcomes. For this factor, the absolute value of Z is not of interest, but
rather the ranking of its possible outcomes, induced by the application of its cumulative
distribution function, FZ . That the price density is a decreasing function of FZ(Z) has
again the interpretation that a cashflow that is likely to assume a high value when FZ(Z)
is low is traded at a high price because of its usefulness in hedging. However, hedging
now takes place not with respect to the absolute level of market risk, but with respect to
its rank among all possible outcomes; essentially this is not hedging against losses, but
hedging against scenarios.
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From the budget condition (19) we obtain (the equality being a consequence of the strict







































U)ζ] + E[Xiζ] =
= ρ
ρi
(Z − π(Z)) + τ−τi
ρi
(FZ(Z)− π(FZ(Z))) + π(Xi)
(48)
It can easily be seen that, as expected, the share of the aggregate risk that the ith
agent holds after the exchange decreases as his risk and uncertainty aversion coefficients
increase. Specifically, Yi depends on how they compare with the corresponding collective
risk and uncertainty aversions. Note that the risk allocation Yi consists of two terms: the
first is a proportional share of the aggregate risk Z, due to risk aversion, and the second
a proportional share of FZ(Z), due to uncertainty aversion.
3.4 Solution for the general case
We now proceed with the calculation of the equilibrium price density, for the case where
each agent’s preferences are characterised by a strictly concave utility function ui and a
strictly convex probability distortion hi. The only additional assumption we make on ui
and hi is that they be continuous and twice differentiable.
In section 3.2 it was shown that at equilibrium the agents’ final positions Yi will be
comonotonic to each other, as well as to their sum Z. Thus for each i = 1, ..., n, Yi can
be written as an increasing function ψi of Z:
Yi = ψi(Z) (49)
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From equation (27) it is then apparent that the price density ζ will also be a (decreasing)
function φ of Z:
ζ = φ(Z) (50)
Thus we can rewrite the condition for equilibrium (27) as:
u′i(ψi(Z))h
′(SZ(Z)) = λiφ(Z), ∀i = 1, ..., n (51)
Taking the logarithmic derivative of both sides of equation (51) (which will exist


















where fZ is the probability density function of Z. Denoting the i
th agent’s risk aversion





































ψ′j(Z) = 1 (55)



































From the condition E[φ(Z)] = E[ζ] = 1 we finally obtain the explicit solution for the
price density:













This price density is a generalisation of the formula obtained by Bühlmann (1984).




τ(1 − y)dy}. In the case of exponential utility and distortion functions
studied in the previous section, the market as well as the individual risk and uncertainty
aversion functions are constant and it is easily seen that equation (59) reduces to (45).
As opposed to the case of exponential utility and distortion functions, we do not
obtain an explicit formula for the risk allocations ψi(Z) = Yi to the agents after the
exchange. Nonetheless, some insight can be gained. Recall the collective risk and uncer-
tainty aversion functions that were defined earlier (eq. (56)). As discussed in section 2.1,
from the quantities ρ(Z) and τ(SZ(Z)) we can determine unique corresponding utility
and distortion functions u and h (up to a normalisation of u).












= −ρ(Z)− τ(Z)fZ(Z) (61)
Substituting the term φ
′(Z)
φ(Z)









The ith agent’s risk allocation, Yi = ψi(Z), can then be determined by solving this
differential equation. As previously, we see that Yi will depend on how the i
th agent’s
risk and uncertainty aversion functions compare to the collective’s. Note that in this
more general case the Yi’s do not consist of proportional shares of Z and FZ(Z), but are
non-linear functions thereof.
3.5 A pure liability market
Here we consider the simpler case of a reinsurance market, where each agent holds a ran-
dom pure liability X̄i ≥ 0 and cash (initial surplus) wi ≥ 0. Thus the initial endowments
are of the form:
Xi = wi − X̄i (63)
The situation is thus similar the one studied by Bülmann (1980, 1984). Define the











































These price densities can interpreted as producing an economically motivated pre-
mium principle Π(X; Z̄), in the sense of Bühlmann (1980, 1984):
Π(X; Z̄) = E[ζX], (67)
where ζ is given by (65) or (66). Note that if we let τi → 0 ∀i in (56) and (59), then
Bühlmann’s (1980, 1984) formulas for the price density are replicated.
4 Equilibrium with risk measures
4.1 Equilibrium with linear utility
We now study the special case where all utility functions are linear, that is, we let
ρi → 0 ∀i. The optimisation problem to be solved by each agent then is:
max
Yi,λi
vi(Yi)− λi(π(Yi)− π(Xi)), (68)
where vi = vhi is the preference operator (15) of the i
th agent. The analogue of condition
(27) in this case is:







and since SYi is decreasing and h
′
i is strictly increasing the random variables Yi, i = 1, ..., n
are comonotonic as previously. Thus SYi(Yi) = SZ(Z) ∀i as before and (69) can be written
as:
h′i(SZ(Z)) = λiζ, ∀i = 1, ..., n (71)
Since E[h′i(SZ(Z))] = E[ζ] = 1 it follows that λi = 1 ∀i and thus:
h′i(SZ(Z)) = ζ, ∀i = 1, ..., n (72)
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This yields the following condition for the existence of equilibrium:
hi(s) = hj(s) ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, s ∈ [0, 1] (73)
Thus equilibrium is reached only if all agents have identical distortion functions or, equiv-
alently, their risk preferences are derived from the same set of probability measures
{P : P(A) ≥ h1(P0(A)) ∀A ∈ F}. A further interpretation of this result is given in
the next section.
Note that we can obtain the market uncertainty aversion for that model, if in equation
(56) we let τj(s) = τ1(s),∀j and ρj = ρ1(→ 0). Then the market uncertainty aversion








4.2 Equilibrium with distortion risk measures
Continuing from the previous section, we let all agents share the same distortion function
hi = h, hence their preference functionals vi = v are identical. It is straightforward that
the optimisation problem (68) is equivalent to:
min
Yi,κi
−v(Yi) + κi(π(Yi)− π(Xi)) (75)
As shown in section (2.2), the functional −v is a coherent risk measure. Thus the optimi-
sation problem (75) can be interpreted as the minimisation of the retained risk, −v(Yi),
to the agent, subject to the budget condition.
Let us now return to the case of the liability market of section 3.5, with Ȳi = −Yi being
the liabilities retained by the ith reinsurer and Xi = wi− X̄i his initial endowment (initial
surplus minus random liabilities). Then it is not difficult to show that the optimisation
problem (68) is equivalent to:
max
Ȳi,µi
π(Ȳi)− µi(−v(−Ȳi)− (wi − π(X̄i))) (76)
In this context we interpret π(Ȳi) as the price that the i
th reinsurer receives for insuring
liabilities Ȳi, π(X̄i) as his expenditure for reinsuring the initial liabilities X̄i, and −v(−Ȳi)
as the retained risk. Thus optimisation problem (76) is interpreted as a maximisation
of the ith insurer’s premium income, π(Ȳi), subject to the condition that the retained
risk, −v(−Ȳi), does not exceed the insurer’s initial capital net of the cost of reinsurance,
wi − π(X̄i).
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It was argued by Jaschke and Küchler (2001) that considering a market equilibrium
with a coherent risk measure (set, say, by a regulator) such as the one discussed here is
a less ‘personal’ way of introducing preferences in market models, as the risk measure
will be the same for all market agents. Our result (73) makes in fact a stronger claim:
equilibrium can be reached only if the same risk measure is used by all agents.
Condition (73) can also be interpreted in a very different light. It has been argued by
Danielson et al. (2001) that regulation, imposing the use throughout the market of the
same risk measure, is bound to result in an increase in systemic risk, since it would lead
to homogeneity of market players’ risk assessment and mitigation strategies. Equation
(73) precisely reflects this concern, as it implies that the use of the same risk measure by
all market agents is equivalent with the agents’ making comonotonic investments.
5 Links to cooperative game theory
5.1 Equilibrium prices as marginal costs
In the equilibrium models discussed in the previous sections, agents’ risk allocations after
the exchange, Yi, i = 1, ..., n, and the price density, ζ, have been found to be functions
only of the aggregate market risk, Z. This invites an alternative interpretation of the risk
exchange as a pooling arrangement, where agents pool their initial endowments, Xi, i =
1, ..., n, and thereafter share the aggregate risk Z by buying their final positions Yi from
the pool according to an agreed price mechanism. The analogy between risk exchange
and risk pooling has already been observed by Borch (1962), who also commented on
the possibility of applying cooperative game theory to the problem. The purpose of this
section is to study the problem of risk exchange from such a perspective.
We defined in section 3.4, equation (56), the ‘collective risk and uncertainty aversion’
functions, ρ(x) and τ(s), without elaborating on the interpretation of these quantities. If
the risk exchange is viewed as a pooling arrangement, the collective risk and uncertainty
aversions can be taken to characterise the preferences of an agent standing for the collec-
tive of agents or, equivalently, to describe the preferences of the pool. As discussed earlier,
from the quantities ρ(x) and τ(s) we can determine the unique corresponding utility and
distortion functions uC and hC for the collective (up to a normalisation of uC). Then the




(hC(SuC(Z) > x)− 1)dx+
∫ ∞
0
hC(SuC(Z) > x)dx (77)
Consider an agent buying cashflow N ∈ X from the pool. We define the indifference
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price of N , πind(N), as the solution of the equation:
VC(Z −N + πind(N,Z))) = VC(Z) (78)
The indifference price essentially represents the cost to the collective of parting from





In the following proposition, the relationship between marginal cost and equilibrium
pricing is illustrated:
Proposition 1. Let the marginal cost price of the cashflow N be given by equations (78),


























Thus, if we consider a risk pooling arrangement as an analogue to the risk exchange,
the price of a cashflow is determined as its marginal cost price to the collective.
5.2 Marginal costs and semivalues of cooperative games
In this section we take a view of the marginal cost price mechanism, in the context of
a non-atomic cooperative game (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) . A rigorous exposition of
cooperative game theory is outside the scope of this paper, so we will restrict ourselves
on a rather qualitative discussion.
We consider the economic agents who pool their assets and liabilities as players in
a cooperative game. Cooperation is here understood as the pooling of the players’ ini-
tial endowments and the agreement on a price mechanism. If we interpret the pooling
arrangement as an economy with a single producer (the pool), the products are the cash-
flows that each agent buys from the pool, and the cost of producing cashflow N is the
indifference cost πind to the pool of parting with the cashflow. In order that the price
mechanism used is acceptable to the players, it must satisfy a number of economically
motivated properties. An appropriate set of axioms was proposed by Samet and Tau-
man (1982). This axiomatisation corresponds to the following requirements on the price
mechanism:
Rescaling: Prices should be independent of units of measurement.
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Consistency: Two cashflows that have the same effect on cost should have the same price.
Additivity: If the cost of a cashflow can be broken into two additive factors, then its price
should be obtainable by adding the prices attributable to the two factors separately.
Monotonicity/Positivity: It the cost function is non-decreasing in a cashflow, then the
price of the cashflow should be non-negative.
Then it is shown (Samet and Tauman, 1982), all price mechanisms satisfying this set







where µ is a non-negative measure on ([0, 1],B), B being the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1].
The same set of price mechanisms has also been derived via purely game theoretical
arguments by Dubey et al. (1981), and its elements are called the semivalues of the
game.
It can be shown (Samet and Tauman, 1982) that for a slight strengthening of the
Monotonicity/Positivity axiom, the measure µ̄ is uniquely given by µ̄(α) = 0, α ∈ [0, 1)
and µ̄(1) = 1. Thus, the price mechanism emerging is actually the unique semivalue





5.3 Equilibrium with risk measures and capital allocation
In this section, we apply the game theoretical framework to the equilibrium model with
risk measures developed in section 4. We show that in this case marginal cost pricing is
a cost sharing mechanism and the equilibrium model can be interpreted as a risk capital
allocation model.
We note that the semivalue (80) of a cooperative game is in general not a cost sharing
mechanism, i.e. the sum of prices that the players pay do not add up to the aggregate
cost to the pool. Let us now impose on the price mechanism the additional requirement:
Cost sharing: The sum of the prices charged by the pool should be equal to the aggregate
cost to the pool.
Under this additional assumption, it is shown in Mirman and Tauman (1982) and
Billera and Heath (1982) that the unique price mechanism satisfying the four axioms of
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the previous section, plus the requirement for cost sharing, is obtained when the measure







In game theoretical parlance, the unique functional πv is called the value of the game
(Aumann and Shapley, 1974).
Let us now return to the equilibrium model with linear utility functions (equivalently
with distortion risk measures) that was studied in section 4. We showed that a condition
for equilibrium is that all agents must share the same probability distortion function
and that this is equal to the distortion function representing the collective’s preferences.
Let, as previously, the corresponding preference operator be denoted by v. Thus the
indifference argument (78) becomes:
v(Z −N + πind(N,Z))) = v(Z)⇔ −v(Z −N + πind(N,Z))) = −v(Z), (83)
which is equivalent to saying that the risk carried by the pool should not change as a
result of trading N .
As a special case of Proposition 1 we obtain:
∂πind(βN, αZ)
∂β |β=0
= E[Nh′(SαZ(αZ))] = E[Nh
′(SZ(Z))], (84)
which is independent of α. Then, from (82) and (84) it is seen that the price mechanism





which is once more the marginal cost mechanism. Thus, in the case that preferences are
characterised via risk measures based on distorted probabilities, marginal cost pricing
provides a mechanism for cost sharing.
The value has been proposed by Denault (2001) as a cost sharing mechanism for al-
locating the risk capital corresponding to a risky portfolio to the different instruments
that it consists of. In Tsanakas and Barnett (2002) this problem was studied in an in-
surance context, with risk measures based on distorted probabilities. In the latter paper
a formula identical to equation (85) was obtained for the risk capital allocated to each
instrument (or sub-portfolio of instruments), using the game-theoretical concept of the
core (Aumann and Shapley (1974), Aubin (1981)). The core of a game is interpreted
as the set of all price systems that do not produce for any player a disincentive to co-
operate. In the context of risk capital allocation, this means that the capital allocated
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to each cashflow should not exceed the cost of holding that cashflow outside the pool,
as determined by the risk measure. Thus, in the case of equilibrium with risk measures,
the price functional calculated in this paper is the only one that would not produce an
incentive for an economic agent to leave the exchange.
6 Concluding remarks
An issue that has so far not been touched upon in the paper is that of Pareto optimality.
A (post-exchange) allocation of risks to market agents is said to be Pareto optimal if
there is no other allocation for which all agents’ preference functionals assume higher
values (and for at least one agent this increase is strict), i.e. no other allocation exists for
which every agent is better off. For equilibrium models with expected utility preferences,
it has been shown in the bibliography (e.g. Aase, 1993) that any competitive equilibrium
allocation is Pareto optimal. The proof relies on the strict increasingness of preferences
and thus easily carries over to our model. Thus the equilibrium allocations calculated in
this paper are also Pareto optimal.
Pareto optimality is closely related to the concept of market completeness. While
Pareto optimality is a property of a specific risk allocation, completeness refers to the
structure of the market itself. It is in general the case that in complete markets equilib-
rium allocations are Pareto optimal (Duffie, 1988). A market is usually called complete
whenever the space of possible payoffs is spanned by the traded cashflows in the market.
In market models such as those treated in our paper, a prerequisite for market complete-
ness is the existence of non-linear contracts on the initial cashflows, Xi. This is because
we consider a continuous probability space, while the number of the initial cashflows is
finite. Note that this situation is quite different from the one usually encountered in the
literature on asset pricing, where portfolios consist only of linear combinations of traded
securities. If only linear portfolios (e.g. proportional reinsurance treaties) were allowed in
the market treated here, it would have been incomplete (though the resulting allocation
would not necessarily be inefficient; for a discussion of this issue see Aase (1993)).
Non-linear investment portfolios can be formed in both the financial and insurance
markets, using for example stock options and stop-loss reinsurance treaties. Nevertheless,
the requirement that any non-linear transformation of the initial positions should be
obtainable (or replicable) in the market appears too strong, especially in the case of
insurance markets. However, we note that the Pareto optimal risk allocations have all
been functions only of the aggregate market risk Z. Thus optimal insurance portfolios
can be approximated using tradable securities such as index-linked insurance derivatives,
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which are in a sense ‘completing the market’. An additional issue that emerges, due
to the probability distortion functions used to model preferences and to represent risk
measures, is the dependence of risk allocations on the term FZ(Z). This term implies
that it is necessary for the formation of optimal portfolios to consider derivatives not
only contingent on the underlying cashflows themselves but also on their order statistics.
Thus generalised preferences and/or regulation create a scope for financial products such
as the ‘quantile options’ introduced by Miura (1992).
Readers familiar with competitive equilibrium models will have recognised in our def-
inition of collective preferences the similarity to the device of the ‘representative agent’
often employed in the economics literature (e.g. Duffie, 1988). The definition of aggregate
preferences is indeed not a novelty; it has been first proposed as a way of solving equi-
librium models by, among others, Wilson (1968) and Rubinstein (1974). One additional
element introduced in this paper has been the definition of aggregate preferences in the
case of generalised expected utility, using what we called ‘collective uncertainty aversion’.
We did not refer explicitly to the representative agent paradigm, but preferred instead
to offer an interpretation of aggregate preferences via the analogy of the exchange to a
pooling arrangement. We found this analogy, as well as the subsequent association of
competitive equilibrium with cooperative games, conceptually stimulating. As Aumann
and Shapley comment in the introduction to their book (1974), ‘interaction between peo-
ple - as in economic or political activity - usually involves a subtle mixture of competition
and cooperation’. We attempted to illustrate this point in the case of a risk exchange,
where competing financial entities cooperate in order to share the risks that they are
exposed to.
Finally, we note that the results in this paper were not obtained at the highest level
of mathematical generality; we chose instead to make assumptions yielding explicit and
transparent formulae. The strongest (and indeed the most disputable) of these assump-
tions has been that of continuous conditional probability distributions, which is a condi-
tion for the differentiability of the generalised preference functionals. Obtaining similar
results without the continuity assumption is a topic for future research; a step into this di-
rection has been made by Acerbi and Simonetti (2002). Other lines of future enquiry could
include the generalisation of our market model to a multi-period (or time-continuous)
setting, as well as the study of equilibrium in incomplete markets. Cooperative game
theory and the concept of the core could provide useful insight in the incomplete market
situation, as was demonstrated by Aase (2002).
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A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The Choquet integral (5) of u(X) with respect to the supermodular set function h(P0),







u(X)(t) is the inverse of the (decumulative) distribution function of u(X) under
h(P0):
Gu(X)(x) = h(P0(u(X) > x)) = h(Su(X)(x))







−1(t)) = u(S−1X (h
−1(t)))

















A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
As before, we use the quantile representation of the Choquet integral:
















Thus, the derivative of Vu,h(X + βN) with respect to β is:
∂
∂β



































So, we finally obtain:
∂
∂β
Vu,h(X + βN) = E[Nu
′(X + βN)h′(SX+βN(X + βN))]
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 is a simple application of the techniques utilised in the proofs
of the auxiliary lemmas. We begin with equation (78):
VC(Z − βN + π(βN))) = VC(Z),
which we differentiate with respect to β:
∂
∂β
VC(Z − βN + π(βN))) = 0
The left hand side of the above equation is:
∂
∂β



















































































This section follows Tasche (2000b). Let X be a real valued random variable. For
a ∈ (0, 1) the a-quantile of X, Qa(X) is defined as:






be a portfolio consisting of random liabilities Xj, j = 1, 2, ..., n. We are interested in
derivatives of the a-quantile of Zu, with respect to the portfolio weights uj, i.e. in




Such ‘quantile derivatives’ exist, subject to a set of technical assumptions. Let n ≥
2 and (X1, ..., Xn) be an Rn-valued vector with a conditional density φ of X1 given
(X2, ..., Xn). φ satisfies the assumptions in an open set U ⊂ R \ {0} × Rd−1 if:
(i) For fixed x2, ..., xn, the function t 7→ φ(t, x2, ..., xn) is continuous in t.
(ii) The mapping




ujXj), X2, ..., Xn)],
R× U 7→ [0,∞)
is finite-valued and continuous.
(iii) For each i = 2, ..., n the mapping






ujXj), X2, ..., Xn)],
R× U 7→ R
is finite-valued and continuous.
If φ satisfies the above assumptions in some open set U ⊂ R
{0} × Rd−1, the quantile derivative exists and is given by:
∂Qa(Z
u)
∂ui
= E[Xi|
∑
j
ujXj = Qa(Z
u)]
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